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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a novel directional modu-
lation (DM) scheme based on random frequency diverse arrays
with artificial noise (RFDA-DM-AN) to enhance physical layer
security of wireless communications. Specifically, we first design
the RFDA-DM-AN scheme by randomly allocating frequencies
to transmit antennas, thereby achieving two-dimensionally (i.e.,
angle and range) secure transmissions, and outperforming the
state-of-the-art one-dimensional (i.e., angle) phase array (PA)
based DM scheme. Then we develop the closed-form expression
of a lower bound on the ergodic secrecy capacity (ESC) of our
RFDA-DM-AN scheme. Based on the theoretical lower bound
derived, we further optimize the transmission power allocation
between the useful signal and artificial noise (AN) in order to
enhance the ESC. Simulation results show that 1) our RFDA-
DM-AN scheme achieves a higher secrecy capacity than that of
the PA based DM scheme, 2) the lower bound derived is shown
to approach the ESC as the number of transmit antennas N
increases and precisely matches the ESC when N is sufficiently
large, and 3) the proposed optimum power allocation achieves
the highest ESC compared with other power allocations in the
RFDA-DM-AN.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, directional modulation,
frequency diverse array, power allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
AS a promising physical layer security technique, direc-tional modulation (DM) has attracted extensive studies
due to its unique characteristic. This characteristic is that
DM projects modulated signals into a predetermined spatial
direction while simultaneously distorting the constellation of
these signals in all other directions. This can significantly
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decrease the probability of these signals being eavesdropped
on. As such, the DM technique is an ideal candidate to
achieve physical layer security [1–8]. In general, there are
two main types of methods to implement the DM technique
in wireless communications. The first one is to adopt DM on
the radio frequency (RF) frontend (e.g., [9–12]). For example,
the authors of [9, 10] obtained the phase and amplitude of
DM signal at the predefined direction through varying the
effective length and scattering property of a reflector. A similar
approach was proposed in [11, 12], where the phase of each
antenna element was shifted accordingly in order to construct
the DM signal. However, the flexibility of implementing
DM on the RF frontend is limited, which leads to high
complexity in the design of constellation diagram for DM.
Against this background, the second method was developed
in the literature (e.g., [13]), which implemented the DM
technique on the baseband instead of on the RF frontend.
Specifically, the authors of [13] proposed an approach to apply
the DM technique on the baseband based on an orthogonal
vector. In addition, the authors of [14, 15] provided a robust
baseband DM algorithm by considering estimation errors on
the direction angles. Implementing DM on baseband enables
dynamic DM transmissions to send the different patterns of
constellation point at different time slots, which results in
that tracking and decoding the useful signals is harder for
an eavesdropper, and thus can further improve physical layer
security.
In the literature, the DM technique can be achieved by phase
array (PA) [11–13]. Considering security, previous studies
on the DM technique only investigated the system where a
legitimate user locates at the desired direction and an eaves-
dropper locates in another direction (that is different from the
desired direction). However, in the context of physical layer
security it is common to assume that the location information
of the eavesdropper is not available at the transmitter, since
the eavesdropper may be passive and never transmit signals,
and thus it is hard, if not impossible, to obtain such location
information. In practice, we may have the scenario in which
the eavesdropper exactly locates in the desired direction as the
legitimate user. In this scenario, the aforementioned DM based
on PA can no longer guarantee the secure transmission for the
legitimate user. This is due to the fact that the DM based on
PA can only distort signals at the directions that are different
from the desired one.
A linear frequency diverse array (LFDA) in [16–18] offers
2new possibilities for DM to guarantee a secure transmission
in the aforementioned scenario where the legitimate user
and eavesdropper locate in the same direction (but different
ranges). This is due to the fact that LFDA can produce a
beam-pattern with controllable direction and range, by lin-
early shifting the carrier frequencies across different transmit
antennas. However, as discussed in [17, 18], the direction
and range achieved by LFDA are coupled. This means that
there may exist multiple direction-range pairs at which the
eavesdropper can receive identical signals as the legitimate
user, which compromises the secure transmission. Recently,
the authors of [19, 20] developed a new type of frequency
diverse array, namely the random frequency diverse array
(RFDA), of which each transmit antenna is randomly (instead
of linearly) allocated a narrow band frequency. As shown in
[19, 20], RFDA owns one property that it can decouple the
correlation between the direction and range (this correlation
exists in LFDA and cannot be decoupled). This property
enables RFDA to be a good candidate for DM to achieve a
robust secure transmission (i.e., physical layer security). In [3],
the authors discussed two main metrics, i.e., ergodic secrecy
capacity (ESC) and secrecy outage probability, which are often
adopted to measure the performance of secure transmissions
over fading channels. ESC applies for delay tolerant systems
which allows for the adoption of an ergodic version of fading
channels. On the other hand, secrecy outage probability, which
measures systems with probabilistic formulations, is more
appropriate for scenario under stringent delay constraints. In
our work, the instantaneous value of the secrecy capacity
at Eve is not available due to the strategies of randomly
allocating frequencies to the transmit antennas in the proposed
scheme. Averaging over all the realizations of the frequencies
allocation, we can capture the ergodic features of the secrecy
capacity. The concept of ESC bears the similar significance as
the one adopted in this paper.
In this work, for the first time, we utilize the DM with
artificial noise based on RFDA (referred to as the RFDA-DM-
AN scheme) to enhance physical layer security of wireless
communications. In this scheme, in addition to maximizing
the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of useful signals at the desired
direction, the transmitter also sends artificial noise (AN) in all
other directions to bring interferences to the eavesdropper. In
order to fully examine the secrecy performance of the RFDA-
DM-AN scheme, we first derive a lower bound on its ESC.
Based on this lower bound, we can determine the optimal
transmit power allocation between the useful signal and AN
more efficiently relative to using the ESC. As shown in our ex-
amination, this lower bound precisely matches the ESC when
the number of transmit antennas is sufficiently large, which
confirms the validity and effectiveness of using this lower
bound to perform transmit power allocation. In addition, we
investigate two strategies of randomly allocating frequencies to
the transmit antennas in the RFDA (i.e., frequency allocations
based on the continuous and discrete uniform distributions).
Our investigation demonstrates that the continuous uniform
frequency allocation outperforms the discrete one in terms of
average ESC.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
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Fig. 1. The structure of the random frequency diverse array (RFDA).
Section II, we detail our system model for the RFDA-DM-AN
scheme. Then the secrecy performance of the RFDA-DM-AN
scheme is analyzed in Section III, based on which the transmit
power and frequency allocations are examined. The secrecy
performance of the proposed scheme is numerically evaluated
in Section IV, and Section V draws concluding remarks.
Notations: Scalar variables are denoted by italic symbols.
Vectors and matrices are denoted by lower-case and upper-
case boldface symbols, respectively. Given a complex number,
| · | and (·)∗ denote the modulus and conjugation, respectively.
Given a complex vector or matrix, (·)T , (·)H , tr(·), and ‖ · ‖
denote the transpose, conjugate transpose, trace, and norm,
respectively. The N ×N identity matrix is referred to as IN
and E[·] denotes expectation operation.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Random Frequency Diverse Array
As shown in Fig. 1, the RFDA (i.e., random frequency
diverse array) is different from the PA (i.e., phased array) due
to the use of frequency increment across the antenna elements
at the transmitter. The frequency allocated to the n-th element
is given by
fn = fc + kn∆f, n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, (1)
3where fc is the central carrier frequency and ∆f is the
frequency increment. In the RFDA, the value of kn is normally
random. One method (e.g. continuous uniform distribution)
to determine the value of kn, which determines one specific
random mapping rule to assign the carrier frequencies of the
different elements, is illustrated in Fig. 1. In this work, we
consider a uniform linear array (ULA) at the transmitter and
set the phase reference at the array geometric center. The target
range for the n-th element is denoted as Rn. In practice, the
target is assumed far from the antenna array, and thus Rn can
be approximated as
Rn = R− bnd cos θ, n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, (2)
where
bn = n− N − 1
2
, (3)
θ and R are the angle and range from target to the transmitter,
and d denotes the element spacing of the ULA at the trans-
mitter. We note that in the LFDA the value kn is equal to bn,
which is a linear function of n [16, 17].
The phase of the transmit signal at the reference element of
the ULA is given by
ψ0(θ,R) = 2pifc
R
c
. (4)
Likewise, the phase of transmit signal at the n-th element can
be expressed as
ψn(θ,R) = 2pifn
Rn
c
(5)
= 2pi
(
fc
R
c
− bn fcd cos θ
c
+ kn∆f
R
c
− bnkn∆f d cos θ
c
)
.
Then, the phase shift of the n-th element relative to the
reference element is given by
Ψn(θ,R)
= ψn(θ,R)− ψ0(θ,R)
= 2pi
(
−bn fcd cos θ
c
+ kn
∆fR
c
− bnkn∆fd cos θ
c
)
. (6)
We note that the second term in (6) is of importance, because
it shows that the radiation pattern of the array depends on both
the range and the frequency increment. Normally, the relation-
ship between frequency increment and carrier frequency can
guarantee N∆f ≪ fc, and element spacing d is close to the
wave length λ (e.g. d = λ/2). As such, the third term in (6) is
negligible [17]. Therefore, the phase shift defined in (6) can
be approximated by
Ψn(θ,R) ≈ 2pi
c
(−bnfcd cos θ + kn∆fR). (7)
Then, the normalized steering vector of RFDA to a specific
location (θ,R) is given by
h(θ,R)=
1√
N
[ejΨ0(θ,R), ejΨ1(θ,R),. . ., ejΨN−1(θ,R)]T . (8)
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Fig. 2. Illustration of constellation diagram in DM system for the QPSK
modulation.
B. Directional Modulation with Artificial Noise
Since DM (i.e., directional modulation) is a transmitter-side
technology, this work considers a multiple-input single-output
(MISO) wiretap channel as shown in Fig. 2. In this wiretap
channel, the transmitter (Alice) is equipped with N antennas,
the legitimate user (Bob) is equipped with a single antenna,
and the eavesdropper (Eve) is equipped with a single antenna.
We assume that the location of Bob, denoted by (θB , RB),
is available at Alice, while the location of Eve, denoted by
(θE , RE), is unavailable at Alice (which potentially exists in
anywhere). In addition, we consider that free space channel
model was widely adopted in the literature for the DM tech-
nique (e.g., [13–15]). Without loss of generality, we normalize
the channel gain to be 1.
Beamforming with AN (i.e., artificial noise) has been widely
used in the context of physical layer security due to its robust-
ness and desirable secrecy performance [21, 22]. Therefore, for
the first time, we adopt the AN-aided secure transmission in
the DM technique based on RFDA. Considering beamforming
with AN, the transmitted signal can be expressed as
s =
√
αPsvx +
√
(1− α)Psw, (9)
where x is a symbol chosen from the complex signal constel-
lation with average power constraint (i.e., E[|x|2] = 1). Also
in (9), Ps is the transmit power of Alice and α is the parameter
that determines the power allocation between the useful signal
and AN. In addition, v is the beamforming vector for the
useful signal. Since Alice does not know Eve’s location, in
4order to maximize the SNR at Bob, v is given by
v = h(θB , RB), (10)
where h(θB , RB) is the steering vector of the RFDA at
Alice to Bob, which can be obtained by replacing (θ,R)
with (θB, RB) in (8). Furthermore, the artificial noise vector
w in (9) should lie in the null space of h(θB , RB) (i.e.,
h
H(θB, RB)w = 0) in order to avoid interference to Bob.
As such, w can be expressed as [14]
w =
(IN − h(θB, RB)hH(θB, RB))z
‖(IN − h(θB, RB)hH(θB, RB))z‖ . (11)
where z consists of N independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian random vari-
ables with zero-mean and unit-variance, i.e., z ∼ CN (0, IN ).
Following (9), the received signal at Bob is given by
y(θB, RB) = h
H(θB, RB)s+ nB
=
√
αPsh
H(θB, RB)vx+ nB
=
√
αPsx+ nB, (12)
where nB is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN),
distributed as nB ∼ CN (0, σ2B). From (12), we can see that
Bob can restore the original signal x from Alice easily without
knowing the random mapping rule. To be fair, we assume
that Eve cannot obtain this random mapping rule as well.
Following (12), the SNR at Bob is given by
γB =
αPs
σ2B
= αµB , (13)
where µB = Ps/σ2B .
Likewise, the received signal at Eve can be expressed as
y(θE , RE) = h
H(θE , RE)s+ nE
=
√
αPsh
H(θE , RE)h(θB, RB)x
+
√
(1− α)PshH(θE , RE)w + nE , (14)
where nE is the AWGN with the distribution nE ∼ CN (0, σ2E)
and h(θE , RE) is the steering vector of the RFDA at Alice to
Eve, which can be obtained by replacing (θ,R) with (θE , RE)
in (8).
As per (14), we can see that the item√
Psh
H(θE , RE)h(θB, RB) distorts the amplitude and phase
of the signals at Eve. In addition, the item hH(θE , RE)w is
nonzero since hH(θE , RE) is not orthogonal with w. This
further distorts the constellation of x at Eve.
Following (14), the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
(SINR) at Eve is given by
γE =
αPs|hH(θE , RE)h(θB, RB)|2
(1− α)Ps|hH(θE , RE)w|2 + σ2E
=
αµB|hH(θE , RE)h(θB , RB)|2
(1− α)µB |hH(θE , RE)w|2 + β (15)
where
β ,
σ2E
σ2B
. (16)
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE OF THE RFDA-DM-AN
SCHEME
In this section, we analyze the secrecy performance of the
RFDA-DM-AN scheme. Specifically, we first determine its
ESC and then derive a lower bound on this ESC. Based on
this lower bound, we determine the optimal power allocation
between the useful signal and AN. Then, two strategies of
randomly allocating frequencies to the transmit antennas are
examined.
A. Ergodic Secrecy Capacity
In the context of physical layer security, the secrecy capacity
is defined as {0, CB−CE}+, where CB is the capacity at Bob,
which is given by
CB = log2(1 + γB), (17)
and CE is the capacity at Eve, which is given by
CE = log2(1 + γE). (18)
We note that in the considered system model without path loss
CB ≥ CE can be guaranteed, since γB is the maximized by
Alice.
The ESC is commonly used for the fading channel with
statistical channel state information at the transmitter. In
general, the ESC is defined as the instantaneous secrecy
capacity averaged over γB and/or γE . Following (13), we
know that γB does not depend on the frequency allocation
at the RFDA (i.e., the values of kn). However, following (15)
we note that γE is a function of kn since both h(θB , RB)
and h(θE , RE) are functions of kn. As the distribution of
kn is available at Alice (the transmitter), we adopt the ESC,
which is obtained by averaging the secrecy capacity over
γE , as the main performance metric to evaluate the secrecy
performance of different schemes. We would like to mention
that the randomness in γE is caused by the random frequency
allocation instead of the fading in our work. Accordingly, this
ESC is given by
C = E [CB − CE ] = CB − E [CE ] . (19)
We note that this ESC C is for a specific location of Eve.
However, as assumed in this work, Alice does not know Eve’s
location. As such, we define C as the average value of C
over all possible locations of Eve, which is determined by the
region where Eve potentially exists. For example, the location
of Eve can be assumed at an annular region centered on the
location of Bob, which is similar to the annulus threat model
mentioned in [23]. The average value of C can be calculated
through
C =
∫
RE∈R
∫
θE∈Θ
Cf(θE , RE)dθEdRE , (20)
where f(θE , RE) is the joint probability density function (pdf)
of θE and RE in the sets Θ and R, respectively. Then,
the optimal value of the power allocation parameter α that
maximizes C can be obtained through
α∗ = argmax
0≤α≤1
C. (21)
5In order to efficiently determine α∗, we have to derive
a closed-form expression for C. However, due to the high
complexity of γE as shown in (15), the closed-form expression
for C is mathematically intractable (not to mention the closed-
form expression for C). In order to facilitate the power
allocation, we next derive a lower bound on the ESC C in
the following subsection.
B. A Lower Bound on the Ergodic Secrecy Capacity
A lower bound on the ESC C is derived in the following
theorem in order to facilitate the transmit power allocation
between the useful signal and AN at Alice.
Theorem 1: The lower bound on the ESC of the RFDA-
DM-AN scheme is
CLB = log2
(
−α2µ2B + αµB(βF + µB−1) + βF + µB
αµB(F − 1η − 1) + βF + µB
)
,
(22)
where
F ,
N2
η(N2 −N(1− Φ2(j2pip)) + S2N (q)Φ2(j2pip))
, (23)
q ,
fcd(cos θE − cos θB)
c
, (24)
p ,
∆f(RE −RB)
c
, (25)
SN (x) ,
sin(Npix)
sin(pix)
, (26)
η , 1/tr
{[
IN − h(θB , RB)hH(θB, RB)
]2}
, (27)
and Φ(·) is the moment generating function (MGF) of kn.
Proof: The cross correlation coefficient between
h(θE , RE) and h(θB, RB) is
h
H(θE , RE)h(θB , RB)
=
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
ej
2pi
c
{bnfcd(cos θE−cos θB)−kn∆f(RE−RB)}
=
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
ej2pi(n−(N−1)/2)qe−j2piknp. (28)
Since in the above expression of hH(θE , RE)h(θB , RB),
only the parameter q, p, and kn are of interest since they
are functions of the location information and the random
frequency allocation. Then, to proceed we define
ρ(q, p, kn) , h
H(θE , RE)h(θB , RB). (29)
The mean of |ρ(q, p, kn)|2 over kn is derived as
Ekn [|ρ(q, p, kn)|2] = Ekn [ρ∗(q, p, kn)ρ(q, p, kn)]
=
1
N2
Ekn,kn′
{
N−1∑
n=0
N−1∑
n′=0
e−j2pi[bnq−knp]ej2pi[bn′q−kn′p]
}
=
1
N2
Ekn
{
N−1∑
n=0
e−j2pi[bnq−knp]ej2pi[bnq−knp]
}
+
1
N2
· Ekn,kn′


N−1∑
n=0,n6=n′
N−1∑
n′=0
e−j2pi[bnq−knp]ej2pi[bn′q−kn′p]


=
N
N2
+
1
N2
{∫
kn∈K
g(kn)e
−j2piknpdkn
∫
k
n′
∈K
g(kn′)
· e−j2pikn′pdkn′
}{
N−1∑
n=0,n6=n′
N−1∑
n′=0
e−j2pibnqej2pibn′q
}
=
1
N
+
1
N2
Φ2(j2pip)
(
sin2(Npiq)
sin2(piq)
−N
)
=
1
N2
[N(1− Φ2(j2pip)) + S2N (q)Φ2(j2pip)], (30)
where g(kn) is the pdf of kn in the set K.
Next, we can derive the lower bound of the ESC C by
using the Jensen’s inequality, i.e., log2 E[x] ≥ E[log2 x]. Then,
following (15) we have
C = CB − E[CE ]
≥ log2 (1 + αµB)
− log2
(
1 +
αµBE
[|hH(θE , RE)h(θB, RB)|2]
(1 − α)µBE [|hH(θE , RE)w|2] + β
)
a
= log2 (1 + αµB)
− log2
(
1 +
αµBEkn [|ρ(q, p, kn)|2]
(1− α)µBη(1− Ekn [|ρ(q, p, kn)|2]) + β
)
,
(31)
where a= is achieved by
E
[|hH(θE , RE)w|2]
= E
[
tr{hH(θE , RE)wwHh(θE , RE)}
]
= Ekn
[
tr
{
h
H(θE , RE)P(θB , RB)E[zz
H ]
P(θB , RB)E[zzH ]
P
H(θB, RB)h(θE , RE)
PH(θB , RB)
}]
b
= Ekn
[
tr
{
h
H(θE , RE)P(θB , RB)IN
P(θB , RB)IN
P
H(θB, RB)h(θE , RE)
PH(θB , RB)
}]
=
1− Ekn
[|hH(θE , RE)h(θB, RB)|2]
tr{[IN − h(θB, RB)hH(θB, RB)]2}
= η(1 − Ekn
[|ρ(q, p, kn)|2]), (32)
where P(θB , RB),IN−h(θB, RB)hH(θB, RB). Noting that
z ∼ CN (0, IN ), and b= is obtained based on E[zzH ] = IN .
6Following (31), after some algebraic manipulations we
obtain the lower bound as given in (22), which completes the
proof of this theorem.
We note that the results provided in Theorem 1 is valid
for arbitrary values of N . Due to the distance concen-
tration phenomenon [24], we know that |ρ(q, p, kn)|2 ap-
proaches its mean Ekn
[|ρ(q, p, kn)|2] when N → ∞,
i.e., |hH(θE , RE)h(θB , RB)|2 in (15) approaches its mean
Ekn
[|hH(θE , RE)h(θB , RB)|2] when N →∞. As such, we
can conclude that the lower bound approaches the ESC when
N →∞. Therefore, we next determine the expression of the
ESC when N →∞ in the following corollary.
Corollary 1: As N → ∞, the asymptotic ESC of the
RFDA-DM-AN scheme is
C∞ =
log2
(
−α2µ2B + αµB(βF∞ + µB−1) + βF∞ + µB
αµB(F∞ − 1η − 1) + βF∞ + µB
)
,
(33)
where
F∞ ,
N2
η(N2 − S2N (q)Φ2(j2pip))
. (34)
Proof: As N →∞, we will have Vkn [|ρ(q, p, kn)|]→ 0
due to the distance concentration phenomenon [24]. As such,
following (30) we have
Ekn
[|ρ(q, p, kn)|2] = E2kn [ρ(q, p, kn)]
=
1
N2
S2N (q)Φ
2(j2pip). (35)
Then, substituting (35) into (31) and performing some alge-
braic manipulations, we can obtain the asymptotic ESC as
given in (33). This completes the proof of Corollary 1.
Similar to (20), we can determine the average value of CLB
over all possible locations of Eve as
CLB =
∫
RB∈R
∫
θB∈Θ
f(θB, RB)CLBdθBdRB . (36)
Then, the optimal value of α that maximizes CLB can be
obtained through
α∗LB = argmax
0≤α≤1
CLB. (37)
In order to fully examine the benefits of the RFDA-DM-AN
scheme, we derive the secrecy capacities of the DM with AN
based on PA (referred to as the PA-DM-AN scheme) and the
DM with AN based on LFDA (referred to as the LFDA-DM-
AN scheme) as benchmarks in Appendix A.
C. Continuous and Discrete Uniform Frequency Allocations
We note that the lower bound derived in Theorem 1 is
valid for any MGF of kn, i.e., for any random frequency
allocation method. In this work, we consider the continuous
uniform and discrete uniform frequency allocations, in which
kn follows a continuous uniform distribution and a discrete
uniform distribution, respectively. The MGF of a continuous
uniform random variable t is given by
Φ(t) =
eat − ebt
t(a− b) , (38)
where t ∈ [a, b]. Therefore, when kn is a continuous uniform
random variable within [−M2 , M2 ], its MGF is given by
Φ(j2pip) =
e−
M
2
j2pip − eM2 j2pip
j2pip(−M2 − M2 )
(39)
=
sin(Mpip)
Mpip
,
where M is determined by the total available frequency
bandwith for the antenna array at Alice.
The MGF of a discrete uniform random variable t is given
by
Φ(t) =
eat − e(b+1)t
K(1− et) , (40)
where K is the number of all possible values of t subject to
t ∈ [a, b]. As such, when kn is within a discrete uniform set
{−M−12 ,−M+12 , . . . , M−12 }, its MGF is given by
Φ(j2pip) =
e−
M−1
2
j2pip − e(M−12 +1)j2pip
M(1− ej2pip)
=
sin(Mpip)
M sin(pip)
. (41)
By substituting (39) and (41) into Theorem 1, we can
obtain the lower bound on the secrecy capacity C for the
continuous uniform frequency allocation and discrete uniform
frequency allocation, respectively. Accordingly, we can obtain
the secrecy performance of these two frequency allocations,
which will be examined in the following section.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we numerically evaluate the secrecy per-
formance of the RFDA-DM-AN (i.e., random frequency di-
verse array based directional modulation with artificial noise)
scheme with the PA-DM-AN and LFDA-DM-AN schemes
as benchmarks. Without other statements, our system settings
used in this section are as follows. The carrier frequency fc
is set to 1 GHz (i.e., fc = 1GHz), the frequency increment is
set to 3 MHz (i.e., ∆f = 3MHz), the element spacing is half
of the wavelength (i.e., d = c/2fc), the location of Bob is set
at (45◦, 120 m), and β = 1.
In Fig. 3, we plot the ESC of the RFDA-DM-AN scheme
and secrecy capacities of the PA-DM-AN and LFDA-DM-AN
schemes versus µB for a specific location of Eve. We note that
this Eve’s location is only for the performance examination,
which is unknown to Alice. As expected, we first observe
that the secrecy capacity of the PA-DM-AN scheme is zero
since Eve is in the same direction as Bob relative to Alice. In
addition, we observe that the secrecy capacity of the LFDA-
DM-AN scheme is much lower than the ESC of the RFDA-
DM-AN scheme. This indicates that our proposed RFDA-DM-
AN scheme can significantly outperform both the PA-DM-AN
and LFDA-DM-AN schemes. We note that Eve can select the
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Fig. 3. The ergodic secrecy capacity of the RFDA-DM-AN scheme and
secrecy capacities of the PA-DM-AN and LFDA-DM-AN schemes versus
µB , where N = 32, Eve’s location is (45◦, 239 m), and α = 0.5.
locations (not the same as Bob’s location) that guarantee a
zero secrecy capacity in the PA-DM-AN and LFDA-DM-AN
schemes, since Eve may know Alice’s location in practice.
However, there are no such locations that Eve can select to
ensure a zero ESC in the RFDA-DM-AN scheme. This is due
to the fact that RFDA can decouple the correlation between
the range and angle in DM, which is detailed in the following
figure.
In Fig. 4, we plot the absolute value of the correlation
coefficient between h(θE , RE) and h(θB, RB) in the PA-DM-
AN, LFDA-DM-AN, and RFDA-DM-AN schemes in order
to further explain the observations found in Fig. 3. As we
can see from Fig. 4 (a), the maximum values (i.e., yellow
areas) of this coefficient |hH(θE , RE)h(θB , RB)| appear in
the direction of Bob, which means that if the eavesdropper
exists along the desired direction, the secrecy capacity is zero
(i.e., the received signals at Bob and Eve are identical). This
explains why the secrecy capacity of the PA-DM-AN scheme
is zero in Fig. 3. As shown in Fig. 4 (b), the maximum values
of |hH(θE , RE)h(θB , RB)| appear periodically around Bob’s
location, which demonstrates that the range and angle are
coupled in this scheme. The periodical peak values indicate
that the LFDA-DM-AN scheme may not achieve positive
secrecy capacity even when Eve is not at the same location.
In Fig. 4 (c), we observe that the unique maximum value of
|hH(θE , RE)h(θB , RB)| only occurs at the location of Bob,
which means that a positive ESC can be achieved as long as
Eve is not at the location of Bob. In practice, if Eve locates
at the same location as Bob, Bob can inform Alice about
this information in order to avoid Eve’s attacks. As such,
the aforementioned observations intuitively demonstrate the
advantages of the RFDA-DM-AN scheme.
In Fig. 5, we plot the average value of the ESC, i.e., C,
and the average value of the lower bound on the ESC, i.e.,
CLB , versus α. For this figure, the potential location of Eve
is uniformly distributed at [0◦, 44◦]
⋃
[46◦, 180◦] in angle and
 
 
 
Fig. 4. |hH (θE , RE)h(θB , RB)| of the RFDA-DM-AN, PA-DM-AN, and
LFDA-DM-AN schemes, where N = 32.
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Fig. 5. C¯ and C¯LB of the RFDA-DM-AN scheme versus α, where µB =
15dB.
[0 m, 119 m]
⋃
[121 m, 250 m] in range. From Fig. 5, we first
observe that the gap between C and CLB decreases as the
number of antennas at Alice (i.e., N) increases. When N is
sufficiently large (e.g., N = 256), we can see CLB precisely
matches C , which can be explained by our Corollary 1. When
N is not very large (e.g., N = 16), we can see that the
optimal value of α determined based on CLB is still close
to that determined based on C. This demonstrates the validity
of using CLB as an approximation of C to determine the
transmit power allocation between the useful signal and AN
at Alice. Finally, in this figure we observe that the optimal
value of α approaches one as N increases. This demonstrates
that Alice does not have to transmit AN when N is sufficiently
large, which is due to the fact that Alice can construct an ultra-
narrow beam towards Bob when N is large enough to avoid
information leakage to Eve. In Fig. 6, we plot the exact and
asymptotic ESCs versus different values of N . In this figure,
we can observe that the exact ESC approaches the asymptotic
one as N increases, which confirms our Corollary 1.
In Fig. 7, we examine the secrecy performance of the
RFDA-DM-AN scheme with continuous and discrete uni-
form frequency allocations. As we can see from Fig. 7,
the continuous uniform frequency allocation outperforms the
discrete one in terms of average ESC. In this figure, we
also observe that the average ESC increases as µB increases,
which indicates that Alice can enhance physical layer security
through increasing her transmit power. Finally, we observe
that the optimal value of α that maximizes the average ESC
increases as µB decreases. This indicates that Alice allocates
a larger fraction of her transmit power to the useful signal as
her transmit power decreases, and she allocates all her transmit
power to the useful signal (i.e., α = 1) when her transmit
power is sufficiently low as shown in Fig. 7.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we proposed the RFDA-DM-AN scheme to
enhance physical layer security of wireless communications.
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Fig. 6. The exact and asymptotic ergodic secrecy capacity versus the different
values of N , where µB = 15dB.
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Fig. 7. Average ergodic secrecy capacity of the RFDA-DM-AN scheme with
continuous and discrete uniform frequency allocations, where N = 16 and
M = 10.
We derived a lower bound on the ESC of the proposed
scheme, based on which the transmit power allocation between
the useful signal and AN was efficiently determined. We
also derived an asymptotic ESC when N approaches infinity,
which precisely matches our derived lower bound when N
is sufficiently large. Our investigation demonstrates that the
proposed RFDA-DM-AN scheme can significantly outperform
the PA-DM-AN and LFDA-DM-AN schemes in terms of
average ESC.
APPENDIX A
SECRECY CAPACITIES OF THE PA-DM-AN AND
LFDA-DM-AN SCHEMES
For PA, the phase shift of the n-th element relative to the
reference element is given by [13]
Ψn(θ) =
2pibn
c
(−fcd cos θ). (42)
9As a result, the cross correlation coefficient between
h(θE , RE) and h(θB, RB) for PA is given by
h
H(θE , RE)h(θB , RB) =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
Ψn(θ)
=
1
N
sin(Npiq)
sin(piq)
. (43)
Since the frequency allocation to each antenna element in
PA is fixed, the instantaneous secrecy capacity of the PA-DM-
AN can be written as
C = log2(1 + αµB)
− log2

1 + αµB( sin
2(Npip)
N2 sin2(pip)
)
(1− α)µBη[1− sin2(Npip)N2 sin2(pip) ] + β

 . (44)
For LFDA, the phase shift of the n-th element relative to
the reference element is given by [17]
Ψn(θ,R) =
2pibn
c
(−fcd cos θ +∆fR). (45)
Following (45), the cross correlation coefficient between
h(θE , RE) and h(θB, RB) of LFDA is given by
h
H(θE , RE)h(θB , RB) =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
Ψn(θ,R)
=
1
N
sin(Npi(q − p))
sin(pi(q − p)) . (46)
Substituting (46) into (15), we can obtain the SINR at Eve.
Accordingly, the instantaneous secrecy capacity of the LFDA-
DM-AN is given by
C = log2(1 + αµB)
− log2

1 + αµB( sin
2[Npi(p−q)]
N2 sin2[pi(p−q)] )
(1 − α)µBη[1 − sin2[Npi(p−q)]N2 sin2[pi(p−q)] ] + β

 .
(47)
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